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Abstract. New interpretation of the Anthropocene is presented, the interpretation based on 
the rigorous analysis of the growth of human population and of economic growth in the past 
2,000,000 years, which are found to have been hyperbolic. The Anthropocene appears to 
transcend the geological epochs of Pleistocene and Holocene. Anthropogenic impacts 
evolved over a long time on the canvas of hyperbolic growth of population. There were 
probably various stages of the Anthropocene in the past 2,000,000 years or even over a 
longer time. The current stage is distinctly different because now, for the first time in 
human existence, we are shaping our global future and even the future of our planet. This 
modern stage of the Anthropocene is characterised by the rapid growth of population, rapid 
economic growth, rapid consumption of natural resources and rapidly increasing impacts on 
the environment. All these features can be easily explained by characteristic properties of 
hyperbolic growth. Hyperbolic distributions are slow over a long time and fast over a short 
time. The origin of the Anthropocene can be explained as the natural consequence of 
hyperbolic growth of population. The mechanism of the Anthropocene can be also 
explained by referring to the mechanism of the growth of population. The beginning of the 
current stage of the Anthropocene is difficult or maybe even impossible to determine 
because anthropogenic impacts are likely to have been increasing monotonically. The 
future of the Anthropocene, which is also our future, is uncertain because it is dictated by 
many critical anthropogenic trends, but notably because the size of the world population is 
predicted to continue to increase at least until the end of the current century to a possibly 
unsustainable level and because the world economic growth follows now an unsustainable 
trajectory. Effects of the current human activities might affect global ecosystems for a long 
time into the future but we might not be there to see them.  
Keywords. The Anthropocene, Economic growth, Population growth, Mechanism of 
growth, Hyperbolic growth, Exponential growth, Future of the Anthropocene. 
JEL. A12, F01,Y80. 
 
1. Introduction 
ever before, in the long history of our planet, was there a single species that 
had such profound impacts on the environment as humans. We have a 
potential of converting this little speck of life in our Solar System to a 
hostile and uninhabitable world but we also have a potential to survive and even 
prosper. Our origin and our impacts on the environment can be traced to the 
emergence of Homo Sapiens around 200,000 years ago or even earlier (Weaver, 
Roseman & Stringer, 2008), but maybe even to between 2 and 3 million years ago, 
if we consider the origin of the genus Homo. However, our strong impacts became 
apparent only recently.  
To understand the dynamics of our impacts it is essential to study the growth of 
population and the economic growth because anthropogenic impacts are the 
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reflection of the growth of population and the economic growth is the reflection of 
anthropogenic impacts. 
Our impacts are now so profound that a new geological epoch, the 
Anthropocene, has been proposed and is becoming widely accepted (Crutzen & 
Stoermer, 2000; Ehlers & Krafft, 2006; Steffen, Grinevald, Crutzen & McNeill, 
2011; Zalasiewicz, Williams, Steffen & Crutzen 2010). This apparently new epoch 
is described extensively in my book (Nielsen, 2006), which contains a 
comprehensive analysis of all critical trends shaping the future of our planet. I have 
divided them into seven groups, (1) the rapid growth of population generally 
described as the population explosion; (2) the diminishing land resources (3) the 
diminishing water resources, (4) the destruction of the atmosphere, (5) the 
approaching energy crisis, (6) social decline and (7) conflicts and the increasing 
killing power. This book is full of facts and figures, which can be used to 
understand the Anthropocene.   
The primary driving force of the Anthropocene is the rapid growth of 
population. Consequently, in order to explain its origin, it is essential to understand 
the mechanism of growth of human population. We have to have clear 
understanding of this topic. Unfortunately, there are certain strongly misleading 
and scientifically unsupported misconceptions in this field of study (Nielsen, 
2016a). The related issue is the economic growth, which turns out to follow similar 
time-dependent trajectories. This field is also affected by similar misconceptions 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2016a). They are all based on impressions and when closely 
analysed they are found to be contradicted by data. We cannot afford being guided 
by such misconceptions. The risk is too great.  
Having described in my book the panorama of all critical trends shaping the 
future of our planet, I have devoted the past few years on the investigation of the 
growth of population and of the economic growth. I have formulated a general law 
of growth (Nielsen, 2016b) and I have used it to explain the mechanism of growth 
(Nielsen, 2016c). A compilation of my publications in these fields of study is now 
presented in a single document (Nielsen, 2017a). My new research is now focused 
on the investigation of the current economic growth and of the growth of 
population. I have formulated a mathematical method of analysis of growth 
trajectories and of forecasting (Nielsen, 2017b), which I use to analyse the current 
growth. The aim of this work is to understand the most likely trajectories of the 
future growth, to understand the warning signs and to understand what needs to be 
done to ensure a sustainable future.  
Growth of human population in the past 2,000,000 years was slow (Nielsen, 
2017c). The first billion of global population was reached around AD 1800 
(Biraben, 1980; Durand, 1974; McEvedy & Jones, 1978; Thomlinson, 1975; 
United Nations, 1973, 1999). Thus, it took many thousands of years, indeed even 
millions of years, for the world population to increase to one billion but after 
reaching the first billion, the second billion was added in just only about 130 years 
(United Nations, 1999). The process of many thousands of years, or even millions 
of years, was suddenly compressed to just over 100 years. Consumption of natural 
resources and the stress on the environment increased rapidly. It might be 
surprising that we have survived this enormous stress. 
 If adding one billion in just 130 years sounds too fast, the next billion was 
added in just 29 years, the next in 15 years, the next in 13 years, and the next in 12 
years, increasing the size of global population to 6 billion (US Census Bureau, 
2017). The last billion, which boosted global population to 7 billion, was added in 
13 years (US Census Bureau, 2017). We call it the slowing-down growth (because 
the last billion was added in 13 years rather than in 12 years or even in a shorter 
time) but obviously the slowing down process is still too slow. 
When closely analysed, data show consistently that the growth of human 
population and the economic growth in the past 2,000,000 years were hyperbolic 
(Nielsen, 2016d, 2016e, 2016f, 2016g, 2016h, 2016i, 2016j, 2017c, 2017d). 
Hyperbolic growth started to be diverted gradually to slower, non-hyperbolic 
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trajectories only recently, around 1950 (for the global growth of population and for 
the global economic growth) but the new trajectories are still close to the original 
hyperbolic trajectories. For the regional growth, the diversions occurred, in some 
cases, even earlier. The fast growth of population in recent years is the natural 
outcome of hyperbolic growth.  Consequently, in order to explain the origin of the 
Anthropocene it is essential to have clear understanding of hyperbolic growth. 
Indeed, the current prevailing misconceptions about the growth of population and 
about the economic growth are based on the incorrect understanding of hyperbolic 
growth.  
Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time and fast over a short time but it is 
still the same, monotonically increasing growth, which cannot be divided into two 
different components. Hyperbolic growth has to be interpreted as a whole. The 
same mechanism of growth has to be applied to the slow and to the fast growth.  
It is incorrect to interpret the slow growth as stagnation and the fast growth as 
explosion, each governed by a different mechanism of growth.  We can loosely 
describe the recent fast growth as explosion as long as we understand that it is just 
a perceived feature, which did not occur at any specific time and that it is a feature, 
which is just the natural continuation of hyperbolic growth. It is controlled by 
precisely the same mechanism as the slow growth. The Anthropocene is the natural 
consequence of hyperbolic growth but, as we shall see, its beginning cannot be 
determined.  
 
2. Hyperbolic distributions 
In order to understand hyperbolic growth, it is convenient to compare it with the 
more familiar exponential growth. They are both presented in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Exponential and hyperbolic trajectories. Hyperbolic growth creates an illusion of 
an explosion at a certain time. The change of direction from the nearly horizontal to the 
nearly vertical growth is real but the time of the change cannot be mathematically 
determined. Hyperbolic growth increases monotonically.  
 
Exponential growth is described by the following equation: 
 
( ) ktS t ae ,          (1) 
 
where ( )S t is the size of the growing entity (in our case, the size of population or 
the size of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), representing economic growth), a
is the normalisation constant, k is the constant representing growth rate and t is 
the time.  
For the distribution shown in Figure 1, 11.414 10a  and 32.400 10k  . The 
size ( )S t is in billions and the time is in years. 
Hyperbolic growth is described by the following equation: 
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( )S t
a kt


.          (2) 
 
Parameters a and k are positive constants but k does not represent the growth 
rate. For the distribution shown in Figure 1, 07.061 10a  and 33.398 10k  . 
In the case of the exponential growth, there is no confusion. It is clear that its 
trajectory increases monotonically and that there is no explosion. However, 
hyperbolic growth might be puzzling and confusing. Such distributions create a 
serious problem in the demographic and economic research. 
Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time, so slow that it is approximately 
horizonal. Then, over a certain short time it appears to be changing its character 
and increases so fast that it becomes nearly vertical. It might be tempting to divide 
this distribution into two, or maybe even three components and assign to them 
distinctly different mechanisms of growth. However, such a division would be a 
serious mistake, the mistake which is unfortunately repeated in the demographic 
and economic research. Hyperbolic growth cannot be divided into different 
components and the best way to see it, is to display its reciprocal values: 
 
1
( )
a kt
S t
   ,          (3) 
 
because in this form, hyperbolic growth is represented by a decreasing straight line, 
as shown in Figure 2. It is precisely the same distribution as shown in Figure 1 but 
now plotted differently. Properties of mathematical distributions do not change 
when they are plotted in different ways but certain features, which are not clear in 
one representation might become clear in another. It is, indeed, now clear that 
hyperbolic distributions cannot be divided into different components. This 
conclusion is so obvious that it is hard to understand how it was possible to create 
the Unified Growth Theory, which is firmly based on the assumption of the 
existence of three distinctly different regimes of growth (Galor, 2005, 2011). 
Mistakes can be made but mistakes can be also corrected and science has many 
examples of corrected mistakes. 
Now it is also clear that it is impossible to identify the time or the small range of 
time on the hyperbolic distribution, which could be claimed as a transition from a 
slow to a fast growth. Which point on the straight line could be claimed as the time 
of an unusual acceleration?  
The transition occurred over the whole range of hyperbolic growth. There was 
no unusual acceleration at any time because such an unusual acceleration would be 
reflected in a change of direction of the straight-line trajectory. The straight line 
remains undisturbed, which means that there was no unusual acceleration at any 
time.  
The nearly vertical growth, which is usually described as explosion, is just the 
natural continuation of hyperbolic growth. It is represented by precisely the same 
straight line as the line corresponding to the slow growth, which means that the 
mechanism describing the slow growth must be the same as the mechanism 
describing the fast growth.  
It is impossible to determine the time of transition from the slow to fast growth 
because there was no transition at any time but a gradual transition over the whole 
range of hyperbolic growth. If we accept that the fast growth of population 
identifies the Anthropocene, then it is now clear that its beginning cannot be 
mathematically determined.  
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Figure 2. Reciprocal values of hyperbolic growth show clearly that hyperbolic distribution 
cannot be divided into two or three different components because it makes no sense to 
divide a straight line into different components. The change of direction shown in Figure 1 
did not occur at any specific time but over the whole range of hyperbolic growth. 
Reciprocal exponential distribution is also displayed. It is an exponentially decreasing 
distribution. 
 
Figure 2 shows also the reciprocal of the exponential growth, which is now 
represented by the exponentially decreasing distribution. 
 
1 1
( )
kte
S t a
 .          (4) 
 
We can take yet another approach to dispel the illusion of stagnation followed 
by a sudden explosion by using semi logarithmic set of coordinates, as shown in 
Figure 3. 
In this form, exponential growth is represented by a straight line. Hyperbolic 
growth is now also clearly seen as a monotonically increasing distribution. It is 
again obvious that there is no unusual acceleration at any time. It is obvious that it 
would be futile to try to identify a place for a transition from a slow to a fast 
growth.  
The illusion of a possible sudden transition is only seen in Figure 1. Any 
attempt to determine a transition from a slow to a fast growth would be strongly 
subjective and mathematically unjustified. There is no mathematical criterium, 
which can be used to determine when hyperbolic growth changes from slow to fast. 
The change takes place monotonically over the whole range of hyperbolic 
distribution. 
 Even for the linear scales, such as used in Figure 1, the illusion of an unusual 
acceleration at a certain time depends on the compression of linear scales. Let us, 
for instance, magnify the part of the plot, which appears to be showing the unusual 
acceleration described commonly as explosion. Such magnification is shown in 
Figure 4, again using linear scales. Now we can see that the change from slow to 
fast growth occurs gradually without any unusual change of direction. Any attempt 
to determine the time of change or even the small range of time would be strongly 
subjective and mathematically unjustified. 
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Figure 3. Semilogarithmic representation of exponential and hyperbolic distributions. 
Hyperbolic distribution increases monotonically and the change of direction occurs along 
the whole range of growth. 
 
 
Figure 4. Magnified part of the linear display used in Figure 1, focusing now on the section 
where there was an illusion of a sudden change from slow to fast growth at a certain time. 
Even by using linear scales, the illusion of sudden explosion is replaced by the natural 
continuation of the same growth. 
 
3. Growth rate 
In order to understand hyperbolic distributions, we have to understand also their 
growth rate. Again, we shall compare the growth rates of hyperbolic and 
exponential distributions. 
Exponential growth is a solution of the following differential equation: 
 
1 ( )
( )
dS t
k
S t dt
 .        (5) 
 
The left-hand side of this equation is, by definition, the growth rate. For the 
exponential growth, the growth rate is constant. It does not matter how large is the 
size of the growing entity, the growth rate remains all the time the same, which 
means that the growth rate per element of the growing entity (in our case it would 
be per person or per dollar) decreases exponentially with the increasing size of the 
growing entity. 
Hyperbolic growth is a solution of the following differential equation: 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
dS t
kS t
S t dt
 .         (6) 
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It is just a small modification of the differential equation describing exponential 
growth but with profound consequences. For the hyperbolic distributions, the 
growth rate is not constant but directly proportional to the size of the growing 
entity. Now, the growth rate per element (per person or per dollar) of the growing 
entity is constant. It is a special kind of a self-propelling growth. Each element 
contributes equally to the growth process. The larger is the size of the growing 
entity, the larger is the combined force of growth and the faster is the growth. This 
is an important characteristic property, which identifies hyperbolic growth. This 
characteristic property can be used to explain the mechanism of the hyperbolic 
growth of human population. Likewise, the equivalent property that the growth rate 
is directly proportional to the size of the growing entity can be used to explain the 
mechanism of the hyperbolic economic growth.  
We can now use parameters describing exponential and hyperbolic distributions 
shown in Figures 1-3 to calculate their corresponding growth rates. They are shown 
in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5. Growth rates for the exponential and hyperbolic distributions displayed in Figure 
1. Growth rate for the exponential distribution is constant, while the growth rate for the 
hyperbolic distribution increases monotonically without any signs of unusual acceleration 
at any time or over any small range of time. It is mathematically impossible to determine 
the time of transition from the slow to fast growth. 
 
We can see that while for the exponential distribution the growth rate is 
constant, for the hyperbolic distribution it increases monotonically with time. 
Indeed, for the hyperbolic growth its growth rate increases also hyperbolically. It is 
because the growth rate per element of the growing entity is constant that the 
combined growth rate increases relentlessly with time. It is mathematically 
impossible to determine the time of change from slow to fast growth. The change 
takes place monotonically over the whole range of hyperbolic growth.  
We can also display the growth rate as the function of the size of the growing 
entity. Such a display is shown in Figure 6. 
It is because the growth rate per element is constant that the combined growth 
rate for the hyperbolic growth is directly proportional to the size of the growing 
entity, i.e. to ( )S t which in our case is the size of population or the size of the GDP. 
This display illustrates again that hyperbolic growth cannot be divided into two or 
three different components and a transition from slow to fast growth cannot be 
associated with any specific time or with any small range of time. The transition 
was gradual over the entire range of hyperbolic growth.  
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Figure 6. Growth rates plotted as functions of the size of the growing entity. The growth 
rate for the exponential growth is constant. For the hyperbolic growth, it is directly 
proportional to the size of the growing entity. This plot demonstrates again that hyperbolic 
growth cannot be divided into two or three different regimens of growth, as erroneously 
assumed in the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2011). It also shows that there was no 
unusual acceleration in the growth rate at any time and thus that the transition from the 
slow to fast growth cannot be assigned to any time or to any small range of time. The 
transition was occurring over the whole range of hyperbolic distribution. 
 
 
4. The doubling time 
It is also useful to have clear understanding of the concept of the doubling time. 
It is important to understand that the concept of characterising growth in terms of 
the doubling time applies only to the exponential growth. The doubling time should 
never be used to describe any other type of growth because it is only for the 
exponential growth that the doubling time represents the characteristic feature of 
growth. Using the doubling time to characterise or describe non-exponential 
distributions is as useful as describing the cuttlefish as, for instance, a green 
animal. For any non-exponential distribution, the doubling time changes as we 
follow the trajectory of growth.   
The doubling time for the exponential growth is given by the following 
formula: 
 
2
ln 2
T
k
 .          (7) 
 
This formula can be easily derived using eqn (1). If we express k in percent, 
then this formula can be rewritten as 
 
2
69.3 70
T
k k
 
 
,         (8) 
 
where k is now expressed in per cent.  This is the so-called ‚rule of 70‛ which 
is routinely but erroneously applied to any type of growth but it should be applied 
only to the exponential growth. Applying it to any other type of growth is not only 
meaningless but also misleading because by applying it we assume that any other 
type of growth is exponential while it is not. If trying to characterise non-
exponential growth by the doubling time is already bad enough, using the formula 
(7) or (8) is even worse. It simply makes no sense.   
For the hyperbolic growth, the doubling time is not constant. It depends on 
time. Using eqn (2) we can show that the doubling time for the hyperbolic growth 
is given by 
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2
1
2
a
T t
k
 
  
 
.            (9) 
 
It is a mathematically correct formula but it has a limited application and 
consequently it should be used with care, if at all. For instance, for the hyperbolic 
distribution shown in Figure 1, at 1000t  , the doubling time is 540 years. It 
means that staring from precisely that time, hyperbolic growth would double in 540 
years. However, if we started from 1100t  , then the doubling time would be 490 
years. Only 100 years difference and the doubling time is already significantly 
different. If we started from 2000t  , the doubling time would be 40 years. Such 
calculations might be interesting, for whatever reason, but they could be of little 
use.  
The doubling time is routinely used to project growth but if applied to any other 
growth than exponential, the projection is both meaningless and misleading. To 
project growth for any other type of growth, a simple but more sophisticated 
method of analysis should be used (Nielsen, 2017b). Prediction of growth cannot 
be based on the growth rate at a certain fixed time, as for the exponential growth, 
but on the investigation of the growth rate over a sufficiently long period of time  
 
5. Hyperbolic growth during the AD time 
Growth of population and of the GDP during the AD time are shown in Figures 
7 and 8. Data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with hyperbolic distributions. More 
extensive analysis is presented in separate publications (Nielsen, 2016d, 2016e, 
2016g, 2017c).  
Parameters describing hyperbolic growth of population are: 08.724 10a  and 
34.267 10k  . Parameters describing the growth of the GDP are: 21.716 10a 
and 68.671 10k  .  
 
Figure 7. Data describing growth of the world population (Maddison, 2010) are compared 
with hyperbolic distribution. Growth of population was not exponential, as incorrectly 
imagined by Malthus (1798) and as often claimed, but hyperbolic.  
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Figure 8. Data describing growth of the world Gross Domestic Product (Maddison, 2010) 
are compared with hyperbolic distribution. Economic growth was hyperbolic. 
 
Hyperbolic growth of the world population was demonstrated as early as in 
1960 (von Foerster, Mora & Amiot,1960). This important discovery is generally 
ignored. I have devoted the past few years of my life to understand the growth of 
population and economic growth, the two crucial processes propelling the 
Anthropocene and shaping our future.  
 
1. I have introduced a simple method of analysis of hyperbolic distributions 
(Nielsen, 2014, 2017e).  
2. I have demonstrated that hyperbolic description of the growth of population 
applies not only to the growth of the world population, as studied by von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot (1960), but also to the growth of regional 
populations (Nielsen, 2016g).  
3. I have demonstrated that hyperbolic description of growth applies also to 
the economic growth, global and regional (Nielsen, 2016d).  
4. I have extended the analysis of the growth of the world population to the 
BC time (over the past 12,000 years) and demonstrated that hyperbolic 
growth applies not only to the AD time, as pointed out by von Foerster, 
Mora & Amiot (1960), but also to the BC time (Nielsen, 2016e).  
5. I have extended the analysis of the growth of population and of the 
economic growth over a longer time (i.e. over the past 2,000,000 years) and 
confirmed the earlier observation of Deevey (1960) that the growth of 
population was in three major stages, but I have demonstrated that these 
stages were hyperbolic (Nielsen, 2017c). 
6. I have explained the puzzling features of income per capita (GDP/cap) 
distributions by showing that they represent nothing more than 
mathematical properties of dividing two hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 
2017d).  
7. I have examined Galor’s mysteries of growth (Galor, 2005, 2011) and 
explained them by showing that they are based on the incorrect 
understanding of hyperbolic distributions (Nielsen, 2016h, 2016j, 2017e) 
and on his habitual distorted representations of data. 
8. I have demonstrated that the Unified Growth Theory describing economic 
growth and the Demographic Transition Theory describing the growth of 
population are based on the incorrect understanding of hyperbolic 
distributions and are contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2014, 2016d, 2016f, 
2016g, 2016l, 2016m). 
9. I have analysed the effects of the Malthusian positive checks and 
demonstrated that they have a dichotomous impact on the growth of 
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population (Nielsen, 2016k) and thus, I have confirmed the earlier 
observation of Malthus (1798) about his positive checks and supported 
them by data, observation which is also unfortunately generally ignored. 
10. I have demonstrated that, with only one exception demonstrated in a weak 
and short-lasting impact, demographic catastrophes did not shape the 
growth of population (Nielsen, 2016e, 2017f). 
11. I have repeatedly demonstrated that Industrial Revolution had no impact on 
shaping growth trajectories, even in Western Europe and even in the United 
Kingdom (Nielsen, 2014, 2016d, 2016f, 2016g, 2016i, 2016m, 2016n, 
2017e).  
12. I have formulated a general law of growth (Nielsen, 2016b) and used it to 
explain the mechanism of hyperbolic growth of human population and of 
economic growth (Nielsen, 2016c). 
 
If hyperbolic distributions are confusing, they are significantly simpler than that 
the distributions describing income per capita represented by the GDP/cap. This 
issue was discussed in separate publications (Nielsen, 2016h, 2017d). Income per 
capita distributions (empirical and theoretical) for the world economic growth 
during the AD era are shown in Figure 9. They were obtained by dividing the 
relevant distributions shown in Figures 7 and 8.  
Distributions describing income per capita are nothing more than just linearly-
modulated hyperbolic distributions. They also increase monotonically and there is 
no transition from a slow to fast growth at any time or over any small range of 
time, even though the linear display creates a strong illusion of such a transition.  
 
 
Figure 9. Income per capita distributions (GDP/cap) obtained by dividing distributions 
shown in Figures 7 and 8.  The puzzling features of growth (the approximately constant 
value over a long time followed by a rapid increase over a short time) represent nothing 
more than just the mathematical properties of dividing two hyperbolic trajectories (Nielsen, 
2017d). The best fit to the data is simply a linearly-modulated hyperbolic distribution. 
Distributions shown in Figures 7 and 8 increase monotonically and consequently the 
distributions describing the growth of income per capita also increase monotonically, which 
can be easily confirmed by the analysis of the growth rate and of the gradient of the 
GDP/cap growth (Nielsen, 2017d). There was no stagnation and no explosion at any time. 
 
There is nothing profoundly mysterious about the income per capita 
distributions. Their puzzling properties are nothing more than just mathematical 
properties of dividing two hyperbolic distributions. It is as simple as that.  
The shape of the ratio of two hyperbolic distributions depends on the relative 
position of their singularities. If the singularity for the population distribution were 
earlier than the singularity for the GDP distribution, then the GDP/cap distribution 
would not be increasing to infinity but it would be decreasing to zero. For the 
distributions displayed in Figures 7 and 8, singularities are: 1979st  for the GDP 
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and 2045st  for the growth of population. The distribution representing the 
GDP/cap ratio escapes rapidly to infinity in 1979. If the singularities were reversed, 
the distribution representing the GDP/cap would decrease rapidly to zero in 1979.  
The mechanism of growth of the GDP/cap ratio can be easily explained. It is the 
same mechanism which describes the growth of the GDP and the growth of 
population, and the mechanism is exceptionally simple (Nielsen, 2016c; see section 
7), which is hardly surprising because mathematical formula describing hyperbolic 
growth is also simple.  
The fast-increasing income per capita is undeniably real but it did not start at 
any specific time and neither was it caused by any mysterious force. It is the 
natural consequence of the action of precisely the same forces that prompt 
hyperbolic growth of population and hyperbolic economic growth, forces that 
change monotonically and produce monotonically increasing trajectories. There is 
no need for introducing or for imagining any other additional force acting at any 
specific time to cause this rapid increase. There is no triggering mechanism, no 
ignition and no sudden explosion.  
The rapid increase is the feature, which represents the natural consequence of 
the monotonically increasing hyperbolic distributions, and the characteristic shape 
of the GDP/cap distribution is nothing more than just the mathematical property of 
dividing two, monotonically increasing, hyperbolic distributions. We can take any 
two hyperbolic distributions described by the eqn (2) and divide them. As long as 
the singularity of the numerator is earlier than the singularity of the denominator, 
we shall get the characteristic features of the GDP/cap distribution. The mystery of 
the GDP/cap distributions is solved and the solution is simple.  
 
6. Hyperbolic growth in the past 2,000,000 years 
Growth of population in the past 2,000,000 years is shown in Figure 10 
(Nielsen, 2017c). Similar trajectory is for the economic growth. 
This study confirms the earlier observation (Deevey, 1960) that the growth of 
population over such a long time was in three stages. However, while Deevey 
imagined that each state was leading to an equilibrium, my analysis shows that 
each stage was hyperbolic. This can be seen explicitly in Figure 11. The first stage 
does not look like hyperbolic in this graph but it is hyperbolic (see the explanation 
in my publication, Nielsen, 2017c). 
 
Figure 10. Growth of human population in the past 2,000,000 years.  
 
It is remarkable that hyperbolic growth was so stable over such a long time. 
There were only two major transitions in the past 2,000,000 years. The first 
transition was between 46,000 BC and 27,000 BC and it was a transition from a 
slow to a faster hyperbolic growth. The second transition was between 425 BC and 
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AD 510. It was a transition from a fast to a significantly slower hyperbolic 
trajectory.  
There was also a minor disturbance during the AD time, which occurred 
between AD 1195 and 1470. This transition represents one and only example of 
impacts of demographic catastrophes (Nielsen, 2016e, 2017c, 2017f). A 
convergence of five major demographic catastrophes were needed to cause a minor 
and short-lasting disturbance in the growth of population, the disturbance, which 
was soon compensated by a faster growth, reflecting the stimulating effects of 
Malthusian positive checks (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 2016k). This transition 
changed the earlier hyperbolic trajectory to a slightly faster trajectory. The overall 
characteristics of the two trajectories are so similar that they can be replaced by a 
single trajectory fitting the data reasonably well (Nielsen, 2016e).  
 
 
Figure 11. Three major stages of growth of the world population in the past 2,000,000 
years: (1) between 2,000,000 BC and 27,000 BC, (2) between 27,000 BC and AD 510 and 
(3) between AD 510 BC and the present time. Each stage ends with a transition to a new 
stage. The last stage experienced a minor distortion between around AD 1195 and 1470. 
This distortion caused a small shift in the hyperbolic growth. With just these three 
interruptions, growth of population in the past 2,000,000 years was hyperbolic leading 
inevitably to the Anthropocene. This proposed new epoch is the natural consequence of 
hyperbolic growth but its onset cannot be mathematically determined. 
 
Currently, from around 1950, there is now a new transition to a yet unknown 
trajectory. This transition appears to be shaped by the increasing application of the 
Malthusian preventative checks but is counteracted by the stimulating effects of the 
Malthusian positive checks in poor countries (Nielsen, 2016k). 
Growth of population and economic growth in the past 2,000,000 was 
consistently hyperbolic. It was interrupted a few times but it soon resumed its 
hyperbolic growth. Relentlessly and persistently, it was increasing the size of the 
world population.  
The characteristic feature of hyperbolic growth is that it contains singularity, a 
fixed time when the size of the growing entity increases to infinity. Close to the 
singularity, the size increases so fast that it can become uncontrollable. Nothing 
can increase to infinity and consequently, such a fast growth has to be terminated 
either catastrophically or by gradually diverting it to a different trajectory.  
The late BC hyperbolic growth was so fast that, if continued, would have 
increased to infinity in 104 BC. Fortunately, it started to be diverted to a new 
trajectory in around 425 BC. The singularity was bypassed by a large margin of 
around 321 years. At the time of the commencement of this major transition, the 
size of the wold population was small, only around 140 million. 
The point of singularity for the later AD hyperbolic growth is in 2037 but it was 
bypassed by 87 years when the growth started to be diverted to a new trajectory 
around 1950. However, this diversion started with a minor boosting, which brought 
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the growth of population closer to the point of singularity. Furthermore, the size of 
the world population in 1950 was around 2.5 billion, much larger than the size of 
population in 425 BC. We are now in a far worse position with controlling the 
growth of population and with diverting it to a new and safe trajectory. 
Analysis of the growth of population suggests a gradual evolution of the 
Anthropocene over the past 2,000,000 years, or even over a longer time, on the 
canvass of the hyperbolic growth. The same pattern applies also to the economic 
growth (Nielsen, 2017c), which reflects our impacts on the environment. The 
currently experienced exceptionally strong impacts are the consequences of the 
natural continuation of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth in much 
the same way as the apparent population explosion is just the natural continuation 
of hyperbolic growth. 
 
7. The mechanism of hyperbolic growth 
If you expect complicated explanations of the mechanism of growth of human 
population and of the economic growth, you will not find them here. Hyperbolic 
growth is described by an exceptionally simple mathematical equation [see eqn 
(2)], and it could be, therefore, expected that the interpretation of the underlying 
mechanism should be also simple. In science, simple solutions and explanations are 
tried first, or at least they should be tried first. More complicated explanations are 
suggested only if simple solutions do not produce satisfactory results.  
Every growth can be, and usually is, described using growth rate. This is the 
quantity, which characterises growth. The larger is the growth rate, the faster is the 
growth.  
Every growth is prompted by some kind of a force. We can assume, and indeed 
it appears to be obvious, that the driving force of growth is reflected or encoded in 
the growth rate. The stronger is the force of growth the larger is the growth rate and 
the faster is the growth. Furthermore, the force of growth determines and describes 
the mechanism of growth.  
We might imagine a variety of correlations between the force of growth and the 
growth rate but the simplest correlation is represented by a force directly 
proportional to the growth rate: 
 
( ) ( )F t R t ,                    (10) 
 
where  can be described as the resistance to growth and ( )R t is the growth rate, 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
dS t
R t
S t dt
 .                  (11)  
 
In science, simple descriptions are tried first because natural phenomena can be 
usually described using simple principles. Complicated descriptions are avoided. 
They are introduced only if simple descriptions are inapplicable and they often 
suggest that we are on a wrong track and that we should look for an alternative 
simple description.    
Equation (10) represents the general law of growth (Nielsen, 2016b). This law 
can be used to formulate a variety of models of growth. Possibilities are virtually 
unlimited.  
The advantage of using this law of growth is that it links growth trajectories 
with the force of growth, which represents the mechanism of growth. Calculated 
trajectories might be represented by complicated mathematical formulae but by 
using this law of growth they can be usually based on simple assumptions about the 
force of growth or at least by assumptions that can be easily interpreted and easily 
related to the real life.  
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Thus, for instance, logistic model of growth is based on the assumption that the 
force of growth decreases linearly with the size of the growing entity. However, we 
might imagine a variety of other shapes for the trajectories describing the driving 
force. This force might, for instance, remain approximately constant over a certain 
range of sizes and then it might start to decrease gradually, faster or slower. 
Another possibility is that again the force of growth might not decrease linearly but 
approximately exponentially with the size of growing entity. Here, again, even if 
we assume a fixed starting point for the force of growth and a fixed, asymptotically 
approachable limit to growth, we can have various representations of the force of 
growth, each producing a different model of growth but all of them belonging to 
the same family of models, which resemble the logistic model of growth but are 
represented by different mathematical formulae. Our task then is not to explain the 
complicated mathematical descriptions of growth trajectories but the significantly 
simpler and maybe even intuitively understood descriptions of the driving force. 
Often, even if we use simple representations of the driving force, mathematical 
description could be so complicated that the relevant differential equations have to 
be solved numerically. However, the starting assumptions can be usually simple. 
Again, in order to explain the mechanism of growth we do not have to explain the 
mathematically complicated descriptions of growth trajectories but the simple 
descriptions of the driving force. This approach simplifies considerably the study 
of the mechanism of growth.  
The fundamental force of growth of human population is obviously the 
biologically-controlled force of procreation expressed as the difference between the 
biologically-controlled sex drive, which is ultimately related to birth rate and the 
biologically-controlled process of aging and dying, reflected in death rate. It would 
be unrealistic to expect that we should provide microscopic mathematical 
description of these biologically controlled forces. Such a task would be impossible 
and even if attempted it would quickly lead to some extremely complicated and 
incomprehensible formulations. Maybe by being so complicated they would be 
sufficiently impressive to be readily publishable in peer-reviewed journals but we 
would learn nothing useful from them. However, the net effects of these 
biologically controlled forces can be mathematically modelled in a simple, 
comprehensive and convincing way.  
We can imagine many other forces controlling or prompting the growth of 
human population but by following the fundamental principle of parsimony in 
scientific investigations, we should consider first only the force of procreation and 
add to it other forces, if necessary. This force is essential and it cannot be replaced 
by other force of forces. We can add other forces to this force but we cannot 
replace it by any other force. 
The simplest way to model the net effect of the biologically prompted force of 
procreation is to assume that on average it is constant per person: 
 
( )
( )
F t
c
S t
 ,                    (12) 
 
where c is a positive constant. 
If we now use this definition of the driving force and insert it into the general 
law of growth given by the eqn (10), we shall get the eqn (6), which describes 
hyperbolic growth. In this equation, /k c  .  
Thus, by assuming the simplest possible force of growth, we have now derived 
the hyperbolic growth equation. No other force is needed. Hyperbolic growth of 
population represents the simplest possible mechanism of growth, the 
unconstrained and spontaneous growth prompted by the, on average, constant per 
capita biologically controlled force of procreation.  
If other forces make a significant contribution to the growth process, the growth 
is no longer hyperbolic. These rare exceptions occurred only three times in the 
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past. The first time during the transition from a slow to a much faster hyperbolic 
trajectory between 46,000 BC and 27,000 BC, the second time between 425 BC 
and AD 510 and the third time between AD 1195 and 1470. Currently, starting 
from around 1950, the growth of population is also no longer hyperbolic, even 
though it is still following closely the original hyperbolic trajectory. We are in the 
process of a new transition to a yet unknown growth. It remains to be seen whether 
this will be short or long transition. 
Analysis of data does not allow for the determination of parameters c and  but 
only of their ratio, /c  . However, for convenience, in the interpretation of the 
empirically determined parameter k , we might assume that the parameter c
remains the same all the time and that only the resistance to growth is changing. 
Hyperbolic growth between around 2,000,000 BC and 46,000 BC was 
characterised by an exceptionally large resistance to growth. During the transition 
between 46,000 BC and 27,000 BC, resistance to growth was undergoing a major 
adjustment to a new value. From around 27,000 BC, the resistance to growth was 
exceptionally low and the hyperbolic growth was fast (as measured by the 
parameter k ) until around 425 BC, which marked the onset of a new adjustment 
in the resistance to growth. The new adjustment continued until around AD 510. 
From around that year, growth of human population settled along a new but slower 
hyperbolic trajectory (again as measured by the parameter k ). During the minor 
disturbance between AD 1195 and 1470 the resistance to growth increased but the 
new hyperbolic trajectory from around AD 1470 was characterised by a slightly 
lower resistance to growth than the trajectory before AD 1195, reflecting the 
regenerating effects of the Malthusian positive checks (Malthus, 1798; Nielsen, 
2016k). The two hyperbolic trajectories, before AD 1195 and after AD 1470 are 
virtually identical. They are only slightly shifted in time and they can be replaced 
by a single trajectory (Nielsen, 2016e). However, the two slightly shifted 
hyperbolic trajectories give a better description of data.  
Equation describing hyperbolic growth [see eqn (2)] is exceptionally simple and 
it is therefore hardly surprising that the mechanism of hyperbolic growth is also 
simple. Explanation of the mechanism of the historical economic growth is also 
simple.  
It is well known that wealth generates wealth. Again, any attempt to describe 
mathematically the microscopic interactions of all market forces would lead to 
incomprehensible, unconvincing and unserviceable mathematical formulations but 
we can model mathematically their net effect. We might consider a variety of 
factors contributing to the generation of wealth but the simplest possible 
mechanism is based on the assumption that, on average, the generated wealth is 
directly proportional to the already existing wealth. Under this simplest 
assumption, the force of the unconstrained economic growth is given by 
 
( ) ( )F t W t ,                    (13) 
 
where  is a constant and ( )W t is the existing wealth. 
If we insert this force into the eqn (10), we shall get 
 
( ) ( )W t R t  ,                   (14) 
 
where 
 
1 ( )
( )
( )
dW t
R t
W t dt
 ,                   (15) 
 
which now leads us to the equation 
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1 ( )
( )
( )
dW t
kW t
W t dt
 ,                   (16) 
 
where /k   . 
This is again the equation describing hyperbolic growth. Thus, by assuming the 
simplest possible mechanism of economic growth we have derived the differential 
equation describing hyperbolic growth. Again, hyperbolic growth describes the 
simplest process of growth. More complicated descriptions of the force of growth 
are unnecessary.  
 
8. The future of the Anthropocene 
The future of the Anthropocene is dictated by the current convergence of critical 
trends shaping our future (Nielsen, 2006) but most notably by the growth of 
population and by the economic growth. We shall now examine what we can 
expect in these two areas. Calculations are based on my method of analysis of 
growth rates (Nielsen, 2017b).   
 
8.1. Growth of population 
The top part of Figure 12 shows the growth rate for the growth of the world 
population calculated directly from the population data (US Census Bureau, 2017). 
From around 1963, the growth rate was systematically decreasing. We can use 
these data to project growth. 
 
Figure 12. Forecasting the growth of the world population. Two representations 
(exponential and linear) of the growth rate, calculated using the US Census Bureau (2017) 
data, are used to generate growth trajectories for the growth of the world population 
(Nielsen, 2017b, 2017e). These calculations are in good agreement with projections of the 
United Nation (2015). However, the UN publication gives no information about the growth 
of the population in the 22nd century. It is important to notice that while the growth rate 
continues to decrease, the growth of the world population continues to increase and is not 
yet levelling off. It is projected to increase at least till the end of the current century.  
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We seem to have two obvious options for the mathematical description of the 
growth rate: (1) to use the wide range of growth rate data between 1963 and 2016, 
which can be well described by the exponential function or (2) to assume that from 
around 2000 growth rate is now settling along a linearly decreasing trajectory. The 
projection of growth of the world population based on fitting exponential 
distribution to the growth rate could be regarded as more reliable because it is 
based on a wide range of data but it is still possible that the growth rate will now 
follow a linearly decreasing trajectory.   
Results of calculations are shown in the lower part of Figure 12. If the growth 
rate is represented by the exponential function, 
 
1 btdS ae
S dt
  ,                    (17) 
 
then the solution of the eqn (17) is (Nielsen, 2017b): 
 
exp bt
a
S C e
b
 
  
 
.                   (18) 
 
For the decreasing exponential function representing the growth rate (see the 
top section of Figure 12), the parameter b is negative and the exponential function 
in the eqn (17) decreases asymptotically to zero. Consequently, S  increases 
asymptotically to the normalization constantC . The eqn (18) could be described as 
a pseudo-logistic trajectory. For the world population, parameters of this trajectory 
are: 102.179 10a  and 21.406 10b   , and its asymptotic value is 15.6 billion. 
The projected population in 2200 is 14.7 billion and increasing. 
If we assume that the growth rate decreases linearly with time, i.e. if 
 
1 dS
a bt
S dt
  ,                    (19) 
 
then the solution of this equation is (Nielsen, 2017b): 
 
2( ) exp 0.5S t C at bt    .                  (20) 
 
Its parameters are: 12.520 10a  and 41.197 10b   . It reaches a maximum of 
11.8 billion in 2105. 
Calculations shown in Figure 12 are in good agreement with projections by the 
United Nations (2015). According to this source ‚The world population is 
projected to increase by more than one billion people within the next 15 years, 
reaching 8.5 billion in 2030, and to increase further to 9.7 billion in 2050 and 11.2 
billion by 2100‛ (United Nations, 2015, p. 2). My prognosis is 8.4 billion in 2030, 
9.8 billion in 2050 and 11.8 billion in 2100 for the trajectory leading to the 
localized maximum. If the growth of the world population is going to follow the 
trajectory leading to the asymptotic maximum, then it will also reach 8.4 billion in 
2030 and 9.8 billion in 2050 but only a slightly larger size of 12.4 billion in 2100. 
The difference between predicted values in 2100 is so small that we shall not know 
until well into the next century whether we are likely to reach a localized maximum 
of around 12 billion or to have the population continually increasing to the 
asymptotic size of around 16 billion, if such a large size can be supported by the 
accessible resources.  
Summary of all these predictions is presented in Table 1. The UN projection 
gives no information about the expected size of population in the 22nd century. For 
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the 21st century, the agreement between these two independent predictions is 
remarkably good. 
 
Table 1. Predicted growth of the world population 
Source 2030 2050 2100 Smax Sa 
UN 8.5 9.7 11.2 NI NI 
CA 8.4 9.8 11.8 11.9 NA 
CA 8.4 9.8 12.4 NA 15.6 
Note: UN – United Nations, (2015); CA – current analysis (Nielsen, 2017b); NI – no information; NA 
– not applicable; Smax – maximum value; Sa – asymptotic value. 
 
The future of the Anthropocene is uncertain. Using the most optimistic 
prediction, the maximum size of the world population will be around 12 billion by 
the end of the current century or at the beginning of the next century, i.e. around 
twice as high as around 2000. Shall we be able to support such a large number of 
people? If not, we might expect a serious crisis.  
However, there is also a possibility that the world population will not reach a 
maximum but will continue to increase to its asymptotic value of around 16 billion. 
By the end of the next century it might be close to 15 billion, i.e. about twice as 
large as the current (in 2017) world population. Shall we be able to support such a 
continuing growth? 
The best option, if we had an option, would be to try to slow down the growth 
of population even more than now experienced, but we can hardly expect that such 
a global undertaking will be ever attempted, or even if undertaken that it would be 
ever successful. It is hard to control the growth of a large size of the increasing 
population, and an excellent example is China. They made a determined effort to 
control the growth of their population and they managed to reduce their growth rate 
to around 0.5% from a maximum of 1.6% in 1988 (World Bank, 2017). The growth 
rate remained constant at around 0.5% for the past 10 years, but recently it started 
showing signs of a gradual increase. If the growth rate is going to remain constant, 
the growth of population in China will be exponential and it will never level off. If 
the growth of population in China is going to continue at the approximately 0.5%, 
its size will increase to around 2.2 billion in 2100 and to 3.6 billion in 2200. 
Compared with the size of the population in 2000, it will be about 65% higher in 
2100 and 170% higher in 2200. By around 2140, the population in China will be 
approximately twice as high as in 2000.   
If we wanted to control the growth of the world population, we would have to 
undertake a massive and consolidated effort. There are no signs that we shall ever 
do it. The evidence-based best option would be to improve the living conditions in 
poor countries because Malthusian positive checks stimulate growth (Malthus, 
1798; Nielsen, 2016k), but there are no indications that this possible solution will 
be ever attempted. Furthermore, improving their standard of living can be only 
achieved by improving their economic status, which would have to be now at the 
cost of the economic sacrifice of richer countries, because the current global 
economic growth follows already an unsustainable trajectory (Nielsen, 2015).  
It is also important to notice that while the growth rate is decreasing the size of 
the world population is increasing. It is not yet levelling off. The size of the 
population will start to decrease if its growth rates is going to becomes negative. It 
will start to level off only if its growth rate will be approaching asymptotically the 
zero value. If the growth rate is going to decrease asymptotically to a positive 
constant value, the growth of the world population will be exponential.  
 
8.2. Economic growth 
Growth rate describing the growth of the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
is shown in Figure 13. Empirical values were calculated using the World Bank data 
for the GDP (World Bank, 2015).  
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Figure 13. Empirical growth rate [R (Empirical, Refined)] of the world GDP, calculated 
using the World Bank data (World Bank, 2015), is compared with the distribution described 
by the eqn (21). The growth rate approaches asymptotically a constant value. Constant 
growth rate generates exponential growth. 
 
 
Figure 14. Data for the world Gross Domestic Product (GDP, World Bank, 2015), 
expressed in trillions of the 2005 US dollars, are compared with the distribution calculated 
using the eqn (22). The world economic growth is now approximately exponential and 
consequently, over a sufficiently long time, unsustainable. 
 
The best fit to the growth rate data is given by the following distribution 
(Nielsen, 2015): 
 
11 ( )rt
dS
R a be
S dt
    .                  (21) 
 
Parameters describing empirical growth rate are: 13.940 10a   , 
423.787 10b    and 24.836 10r   . The asymptotic limit of the growth rate is 
22.538 10  or approximately 2.5%. The growth rate in 2014 was 2.7%, i.e. close 
to its asymptotic value. Constant growth rate describes exponential growth, which 
after a sufficiently long time is unsustainable. Even now, the growth of world GDP 
is approximately exponential.  
Solution of the eqn (21) is given by the following distribution (Nielsen, 2015): 
 
1
( ) exp ln( )rt
t
S t C a be
a ra
    
 
.                             (22) 
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Its asymptotic form is represented by the exponential function, 
 
( ) exp
t
S t C
a
 
   
 
.                  (23) 
 
The distribution given by the eqn (22) is compared with the GDP data (World 
Bank, 2015) in Figure 14. 
Expressed in constant 2005 US dollars, the world GDP in 2014 was about 40% 
higher than in 2000. If the growth continues along the predicted trajectory, the size 
of the GDP in 2100 will be around 12 times higher than in 2000. Economic output 
of one year in 2000 will have to be generated in one month. In 2200, economic 
output will have to be around 170 times higher than in 2000. In one month we shall 
have to produce about 14 time more than we were producing in one year in the year 
2000. Shall we be able to support such a dramatic increase in the economic 
growth? Even if we had a sufficient supply of natural resources, shall we be able to 
tolerate such continuing increase in the annual economic stress? Shall we be able to 
cope with such continuing increase of the annual economic output? 
It seems to be clear that, over a sufficiently long time, exponential economic 
growth is unsustainable and that it will have to be changed. It is unlikely that global 
economic growth will be ever regulated and consequently any diversion from the 
exponential growth is going to happen most likely spontaneously, but spontaneous 
diversion is unpredictable. It might occur without any dramatic consequences but it 
could be also catastrophic.    
A way out would be to start to decrease the growth rate along a suitably faster 
trajectory (if it could be done by some international agreement or by default). Such 
a gradual but consistently faster decrease of the growth rate could lead to a 
maximum in the size of the GDP or to its logistic limit (Nielsen, 2015). However, 
the general tendency is to increase the growth rate or at least to keep it constant. 
Economic status of a country is judged to be sound if its economic growth rate is 
high. It is therefore unlikely that the growth rate describing global economic 
growth will be decreasing faster than indicated by data, unless by default, which 
again indicates that the future of the Anthropocene is uncertain. This stage might 
have a dramatic termination sooner than we expect, the termination, which could 
take us by surprise in much the same way as the rapid growth of population.  
Maybe, with a sufficient foresight and coordinated effort we could have 
controlled the growth of population when its size was still small. Maybe we could 
have been also able to control economic growth. Malthus (1798) was wrong in 
claiming that the growth of population increases geometrically (exponentially). 
Population was never increasing exponentially but hyperbolically. However, 
Malthus was right when he was warning against the excessive growth of 
population. His warning was about 200 years ago. We had enough time to try to 
control the growth of population. However, his warning has been ignored in much 
the same way as the repeated warnings of scientists are now also consistently 
ignored. The Anthropocene does not have a promising future.  
 
9. Searching for the beginning of the Anthropocene 
The Anthropocene is proposed to be a geological epoch characterised by strong 
human impacts on the environment. However, the analysis of the growth of human 
population suggests that it is difficult to determine the beginning of this epoch. 
Data suggest that its beginning should be perhaps traced to around 2,000,000 years 
ago or even earlier, to the more distant dawn of the existence of hominines. 
Initially, Nature might have had the upper hand but gradually hominines were 
taking control of their destiny. They survived and they were making progress in 
their exploitation of planet’s resources and in using them to their advantage. 
Gradually, their impact on the environment was increasing and it even became 
destructive but it was never as strong and as destructive as it is now.  
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The Anthropocene seems to transcend the Pleistocene and the Holocene epochs. 
Our presence, the evolution of our skills and the evolution of our impacts on the 
environment can be found in archaeological records. The Anthropocene is the integral 
part of the history of the growth of human population, which with the exception of 
just two or three interruptions (Nielsen, 2016e, 2017c), was hyperbolic in the past 
2,000,000 years. As observed by Waters, et al., (2016, p. aad2622-2) the ‚increase 
in the consumption of natural resources is closely linked with the growth of the 
human population.‛  
The origin of the Anthropocene, including our current strong impacts on the 
environment, can be explained as being the natural consequence of the hyperbolic 
growth of human population. If we want to understand the latest fast increase in the 
growth of population and in the intensity of anthropogenic impacts we should look 
for explanation in the hyperbolic growth. Exponential growth does not produce 
such fast-increasing effects over a short time; hyperbolic growth does, even though 
it remains monotonic. The growth of population was hyperbolic. It was never 
exponential (Nielsen, 2016e, 2017c; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). 
The mechanism of the Anthropocene can be also explained by linking it with 
the mechanism of the hyperbolic growth of human population. Gradually, our 
impacts on the environment were increasing and eventually they became so strong 
and so visible that we perceive them as representing a new geological epoch, which 
we call the Anthropocene, but this epoch, if it is going to be recognised as a new 
geological epoch, started to evolve long time ago.  
There were probably several stages of the Anthropocene in the past 2,000,000 
years, culminating with our current stage. The precise time of the beginning of the 
current stage is hard, maybe even impossible, to determine. If we are looking for a 
suddenly-appearing marker or for a marker with an abrupt change in its intensity, a 
marker that we could use to determine the beginning of the modern stage of the 
Anthropocene, we shall definitely not find it in the growth of population or in the 
economic growth because there was no sustained boosting of their trajectories.  
However, there is one distinctive difference between our current impacts and 
impacts in the past, the difference which might be used to distinguish the current 
stage of the Anthropocene from all other earlier stages. This difference is in the 
intensity of anthropogenic impacts. For the first time in human history our impacts 
are so strong that we are now shaping our global future and even the future of our 
planet. For the first time in human existence there is now also a large number of 
people living on our planet, larger than ever before. This large number of people is 
not a result of some new force boosting the growth trajectory but of the same force 
as before, the force responsible for the monotonically increasing, hyperbolic 
growth of population. Hyperbolic growth of population explains the fast-increasing 
size of the population in recent years and the fast-increasing anthropogenic 
impacts.  
The current large size of global population and their strong impacts are the 
natural consequence of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. 
Hyperbolic growth does not explode suddenly. It is not characterised by any 
sudden takeoff, sudden sprint, sudden great escape or great acceleration. All these 
features are the illusions of hyperbolic growth and it would be good for us to learn 
it and to accept it because only then we can make progress with the interpretations 
of our current anthropogenic impacts on the environment and with the 
interpretation of the beginning of the Anthropocene.  
I cannot stress it too strongly that hyperbolic or hyperbolic-like distributions are 
exceptionally deceptive and even the most prominent researchers fall into their 
trap. Anthropogenic trends have to be analysed carefully and methodically to avoid 
making an easy mistake of seeing a sudden increase when the observed increase 
could be just the natural continuation of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic 
distribution or of a hyperbolic-like distribution. It is easy to fall into the trap of 
hyperbolic illusions. Many mistakes were made in the past with the interpretation 
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of hyperbolic distributions and great care should be taken to avoid repeating such 
mistakes now or in the future. 
The term ‚hyperbolic-like distribution‛ needs to be explained. From around AD 
1470 (after the minor disturbance, which occurred between AD 1195 and 1470) the 
growth of human population and the economic growth were continuing to increase 
monotonically along hyperbolic trajectories. Any other anthropogenic signature is 
likely to have been increasing in much the same way, or at least increasing 
monotonically. Furthermore, any perceived sharp increase is likely to be just a 
hyperbolic illusion because the growth of population was hyperbolic and even now 
it is still continuing close to the historical hyperbolic trajectory (Nielsen, 2016e). It 
is only by a close and careful analysis of data that we can detect a slow and 
ongoing diversion to a new trajectory from around 1950. However, the new 
trajectory is still so close to the historical hyperbolic trajectory that it continues to 
resemble hyperbolic growth. It is a hyperbolic-like distribution because it retains 
the essential features of hyperbolic distribution. It does not increase to infinity at a 
fixed time but it increases rapidly within a small interval of time. 
However, there are many other examples of hyperbolic-like distributions. Their 
common characteristic features are their slow growth over a long time and fast 
growth over a short time. They might appear to be non-monotonic but they are 
monotonic. A transition from a slow to a fast growth cannot be mathematically 
determined. It occurs monotonically along the entire range of these distributions. 
Hyperbolic or hyperbolic-like distributions create an illusion of a sudden increase 
but it is just an illusion.  
When studying anthropogenic signatures, we should be on guard against such 
illusions. The growth of human population was hyperbolic. It is still hyperbolic-
like and any anthropogenic signature is likely to be characterised by the same 
properties as the distributions describing the growth of human population or 
economic growth. Maybe some of these signatures will follow non-monotonically 
increasing trends but any perceived sudden acceleration in their trajectories would 
have to be positively identified before claiming it as a marker of a transition to the 
new stage of the Anthropocene. The corresponding trajectories would also have to 
illustrate our global impacts on the environment.    
Recently, Chiaia-Hernández, et al., (2017) published results of an excellent and 
interesting study of contamination history in two lakes in Central Europe in the 
past 100 years and suggested that their results could contribute to the determination 
of the starting point of the Anthropocene. Their data are local and many more of 
such high-quality data would be required to establish global correlations. However, 
visual examination of their diagrams (presented in their Figures 3 and 5) suggests 
that their time-dependent distributions are probably hyperbolic or at least that they 
increase monotonically. Plotting them by using linear scales of reference could be 
self-misleading. These distributions should be closely examined but they appear to 
have been increasing without a sudden acceleration. I do not dispute their 
determined maxima but I only question the apparent sudden increase in their 
distributions.   
The ‛Great Acceleration‛ in the growth of population claimed by Waters et al. 
(2016) definitely never happened. It is interesting that the claimed ‚Great 
Acceleration‛ in the growth of population around 1950 is in fact the beginning of a 
slow diversion to a slower trajectory (Nielsen, 2016e, 2017c).  
The claim of the ‚Great Acceleration‛ is similar to the claim of the ‚Great 
Divergence‛ in the economic growth (Galor, 2005, 2011), which upon closer 
examination was found to be contradicted by data (Nielsen, 2016j). The ‚Great 
Divergence‛ never happened and it looks that the Great Acceleration also never 
happened. It certainly did not happened in the growth of population or in the 
economic growth. 
Steffen, et al., (2015) published the most interesting collection of diagrams 
illustrating rapid increase in various anthropogenic signatures. These diagrams 
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appear to be correct but I would question some of their sources. I also have a 
problem with accepting their claim of the Great Accelerations.  
Various trajectories representing anthropogenic activities were increasing fast 
because population was also increasing fast but population was increasing fast 
because it was following the monotonically increasing hyperbolic trajectory, which 
was recently diverted slowly to a hyperbolic-like trajectory (Nielsen, 2016e). In 
order to understand all these fast-increasing trajectories and in order to interpret 
them properly we have to go back to the growth of population and understand its 
dynamics. All is going to become clear and less mysterious if we realise that the 
growth of population was not exponential but hyperbolic. We have to learn more 
about hyperbolic growth, we have to accept it and only then we can make progress 
with our understanding of the current anthropogenic impacts on the environment.    
To prove the presence of the ‚Great Acceleration‛ we would have to compere 
the growth before and after the time of the perceived or claimed acceleration. We 
would have to demonstrate a clear discontinuity in the growth trajectory. A great 
acceleration would be indicated by a great discontinuity, which should be easy to 
demonstrate. No such clearly outlined great discontinuity is presented in the 
published diagrams (Steffen, et. al., 2015).  
What we could perhaps see as an acceleration in some rare cases is likely to be 
nothing more than the natural continuation of hyperbolic growth in much the same 
way as the perceived population explosion is also just the natural continuation of 
hyperbolic growth. Great accelerations would have to be proven. No such proof is 
presented by Steffen, et. al., (2015) and no such proof is offered by Waters et al., 
(2016). 
Will Steffen informed me that the term "Great Acceleration" is not supposed to 
be interpreted in the mathematical sense but in a general sense, whatever it means. 
However, the ‚Great Acceleration‛ is supposed to have happened around or even 
precisely in 1950 (Waters et al., 2016), so it is understood in the mathematical 
sense.  
Acceleration implies an event, which starts to occur at a certain time. It implies 
a change. A change has to occur at a certain time; otherwise there is no change. 
The beginning of a small acceleration could be unnoticed and ignored but a great 
acceleration is hard to miss and it definitely should be seen as starting at a certain 
time.  
If there is no ‚Great Acceleration‛ in the mathematical sense, then there is no 
Great Acceleration. If the ‚Great Acceleration‛ cannot be convincingly 
demonstrated, then it cannot be accepted. Imagination plays an important role in 
scientific research but science is not based on imaginations. It is based on data, 
which we can use to check our imaginations, our claims, theories and expectations. 
Science is based on a convincing and verifiable evidence. 
The term ‚Great Acceleration‛ was coined in 2006 by a group of 
interdisciplinary scholars (Hibbard, et. al., 2006; Steffen, 2017). It is a vague and 
misleading term, which should have never been introduced and definitely it should 
not be used. 
Great Accelerations were claimed by Waters et al. (2016), not in a general sense 
but it the mathematical sense. Their numerous diagrams strongly suggest that the 
beginning of the Anthropocene can be determined by data but such a conclusion 
appears to be incorrect. Data would have to be properly analysed to see whether 
there was a Great Acceleration in 1950 or in some other time.  
We might wish strongly to have a clear signature for the beginning of the 
Anthropocene but such a signature would be probably difficult, maybe even 
impossible, to find because the growth of population was increasing monotonically 
and anthropogenic signatures are likely to have been increasing also 
monotonically. We should be prepared that the beginning of the modern stage of 
the Anthropocene will probably never be positively and convincingly determined.  
The desire to locate the beginning of the Anthropocene is so strong that even the 
imaginary Great Acceleration is used for this purpose. ‚Although there has been 
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much debate around the proposed starting date for the Anthropocene, the beginning 
of the Great Acceleration has been a leading candidate (Zalasiewicz et al., 2012)‛ 
(Steffen, et. al., 2015, p. 83). Here again, the Great Acceleration is not interpreted 
in a general sense but in the mathematical sense because we want to use its 
beginning to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene. We are not referring 
here to the generally increasing intensity of anthropogenic impacts but to impacts 
that started to occur at a certain time. We would have to prove that they started to 
occur at a certain time before we could use their beginning to determine the 
beginning of the Anthropocene.  
The beginning of the Great Acceleration cannot be used for determining the 
beginning of the Anthropocene because there is no definite proof that there was a 
Great Acceleration in the mathematical sense. The Great Acceleration in a general 
sense cannot be used to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene because the 
Great Acceleration in a general sense has no clearly defined beginning.  
Some data describing anthropogenic impacts (Steffen, et al., 2004; Steffen, et. 
al., 2015) extend to 1750. Some start from a later year, probably because there are 
no earlier data or because they illustrate activities that emerged only in recent 
years. For instance, the number of McDonald restaurants increased rapidly from 
1950. We obviously cannot use this signature to determine the beginning of the 
Anthropocene but we could include it in a combined analysis of new trends. 
Out of 24 diagrams presented by Steffen et al. (2004) only one (‚Coastal Zone: 
Biochemistry‛) shows great acceleration just before 1950. Should we use this trend 
to determine the beginning of the Anthropocene? Probably not because this trend 
does not represent data but ‚model-calculated partitions of the human-induced 
nitrogen perturbation fluxes‛ (Steffen, et al. 2004, p. 133; emphasis added).  
In the scientific research it is important to go with the flow, to follow the lead in 
data and to be always on guard not to see in data what we want to see. We might 
use data to define the beginning of the Anthropocene but it is doubtful that we shall 
positively determine its beginning. Our definition of the beginning of the 
Anthropocene, if clearly stated and supported by data, might or might not be 
accepted by the scientific community. To determine the beginning of the 
Anthropocene we would have to work much harder and we would have to produce 
convincing evidence in data. 
The development and proliferation of nuclear weapons might be used to define 
the beginning of the modern stage of the Anthropocene because now, for the first 
time in human existence we have the power to cause global destruction. Certain 
new trends, such as production of motor vehicles, airplanes and of the synthetic 
fixation of nitrogen by using the Haber-Bosch process, could be perhaps also used 
to define the beginning of the Anthropocene. Maybe we could also use them to 
determine the beginning of the Anthropocene but we would have to present a 
sufficient number of examples of such trends to demonstrate a clear shift in the 
anthropogenic impacts. These trends would have to be minutely and carefully 
analysed. 
Industrial Revolution could be also used to define the beginning of the modern 
stage of the Anthropocene. However, it cannot be used to determine its beginning 
because it had no impact on changing growth trajectories describing the growth of 
population and economic growth (Nielsen, 2014, 2016d, 2016f, 2016g, 2016n) but 
it probably sustained their hyperbolic growth. Maybe without the Industrial 
Revolution the growth of population and economic growth would have started to 
deviate to slower trajectories, but it is only a speculation, which would be hard or 
even impossible to proof.  
Production of the reactive nitrogen could be also used to define the beginning of 
the modern stage of the Anthropocene but it cannot be used to determine its 
beginning because it did not cause a substantial and sustained boosting in the 
growth of population or in the economic growth. There was only minor and 
temporary boosting in the growth of population (Nielsen, 2016c), which coincides 
with the onset of the surge in the production of the reactive nitrogen but it was 
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probably not caused by this production. The production of the reactive nitrogen 
probably also helped in sustaining the growth of population but it did not boost 
substantially this growth.  
Stratigraphic records would be desirable but it is probably still too early to 
demonstrate a clear transition in stratigraphic deposits. There appears to be no 
stratigraphic need to use the concept of the Anthropocene as a new geological 
epoch. There is, however, a need to find stratigraphic evidence to support this 
concept.  
Waters et al. (2016) use HYDE data base (Goldewijk, Beusen & Janssen, 2016) 
for the growth of population but these ‚data‛ are unreliable. I have noticed a 
serious discrepancy between their ‚data‛ and the data coming from reputable 
sources. I have asked Klein Goldewijk for explanation. He has kindly responded to 
my query and here is his answer: ‚Sometimes, it seemed to me that numbers could 
not have been that low, it would result in very high growth rates indeed to reach the 
numbers reported in later times. So I’ve adjusted the numbers were (sic) I felt it 
was appropriate. I admit that for sure most estimates are highly uncertain!‛ 
(Goldewijk, 2016). His honest answer is appreciated but if we produce ‚data‛ 
based on our personal likes and dislikes or on our personal prejudice we can hardly 
claim them as data. 
These high growth rates, which worried Goldewijk so much and which looked 
to him unacceptable, were there because the growth was hyperbolic. For the 
hyperbolic growth, the growth rate increases hyperbolically with time or linearly 
with the size of the growing entity (cf. eqns (5) and (6) and see Figures 5 and 6). 
Goldewijk did not like the well-documented data so he converted hyperbolic 
growth to the exponential. So now we know that the growth was not hyperbolic but 
exponential as shown clearly by the fabricated ‚data‛ (Goldewijk, Beusen & 
Janssen, 2016). We might know it but it is not science. Data play fundamental role 
in scientific research and every scientist would prefer to have reliable data 
published in reliable sources by reputable and unbiased scientists. 
Deliberate fabrication or interference with data is like an assignation of science. 
This is the worse we can do to the scientific research. It is worse than using data 
and failing to interpret them correctly. People will rely on such fabricated ‚data‛, 
they will use them and they will come to wrong conclusions. One incorrect 
conclusion will stimulate another and soon a whole pseudo-scientific field is 
created. We can see it in the demographic and economic research, which are based 
on misinterpretations of hyperbolic distributions, and now we can see it also in the 
research about the anthropogenic impacts, which appears to be based not only on 
the misinterpretations of data but also on the fabricated data. It is like cancer, 
spreading through peer-reviewed journals and killing science. Relying on such data 
is like leaning on a broken reed. 
Tailored data might look attractive but they have no scientific value. Tailored 
data are unacceptable, even if they are perfect, because they are tailored. The 
HYDE data base (Goldewijk, Beusen & Janssen, 2016) is unreliable and anyone 
who uses it takes a risk of being led to incorrect conclusions.    
Estimates of the size of human population in the past are not perfect but they are 
acceptable if based on unbiased research of reputable scholars. It is, however, 
remarkable that these imperfect estimates are so consistent that they show clearly 
hyperbolic growth of human population, not just over a short time, as first observed 
by von Foerster, Mora & Amiot (1960), but over the past 12,000 years (Nielsen, 
2016e) and even over the past 2,000, 000 years; not only for the growth of global 
population but also for regional populations (Nielsen, 2016g); not only for the 
growth of population but also for the economic growth (Nielsen, 2016d). All these 
distributions show consistently hyperbolic growth. It is also remarkable because it 
would be unreasonable to suggest a collective conspiracy of various scholars 
working in different geographic locations and at different time to prove hyperbolic 
growth of population or the hyperbolic economic growth.  
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If you are looking for a good and reliable database for the growth of human 
population in the past 2,000,000, you will find it in my publication (Nielsen, 
2017c). The tabulated values listed in this publication are based on a rigorous 
analysis of the reliable estimates of the size of population. These values represent 
the best fit to the data (see Figure 10). If you can trust this fit, you can trust the 
tabulated values. Reliable data from 1950 are listed in the International Data Base 
(US Census Bureau, 2017). In the same publication (Nielsen, 2017c), you will also 
find tabulated values describing economic growth in the past 2,000,000 years. They 
are based on my analysis of income per capita (Nielsen, 2017d). From 1950, data 
are listed by Maddison (2010) and in the Maddison Project Database (GGDC, 
2013). 
Waters et al. (2016, p. aad2622-2) mention also that ‚human impacts 
contributed to the extinction of Pleistocene megafauna.‛ This concept was 
supported by Barnosky (2008) by using fabricated ‚data‛ of Hern (1999). It is 
interesting that, on close examination, even these fabricated data do not support the 
concept of human-induced extinction of megafauna (Nielsen, 2013a).  
I have asked Warren Hern for the explanation of his ‚data‛ and this is what he 
wrote: ‚I did not intend in any way to offer my table of the number of doublings as 
‘data’ or a prediction.   All of the numbers – and I don't think there are any 
exceptions –  are imprecise to wildly wrong and based on estimates ranging from 
considered evaluation of available data (?) to total speculation‛ (Hern, 2013). 
Hern learned about exponential growth directly from Bartlett (Hern, 2013) who 
delivered around 1600 lectures on this topic and who also published a book 
discussing properties of exponential distributions (Bartlett, 2004). Bartlett was an 
excellent scholar. Unfortunately, Hern was so fascinated by what he learned that he 
created a table of totally fictitious numbers, which were supposed to describe the 
growth of human population from 3,000,000 BP (before present). His table is made 
of sections of exponential growth. The whole set of numbers is so obviously wrong 
that it is not difficult to see it and yet he published them in a peer-reviewed journal 
(Hern, 1999). Barnosky likes the concept of the extinction of megafauna by 
humans. He used the fictitious numbers of Hern for the alleged but totally fictitious 
growth of population (I call them Phasmapithecus) and published his results in a 
peer-reviewed journal (Barnosky, 2008). Now, this dubious and questionable claim 
(Nielsen, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c) is repeated without any reservation by Waters et al. 
(2016) and published also in a prestigious, peer-reviewed journal. These examples 
illustrate how one misinformation can spread easily around and derail scientific 
research. 
The intensified human impacts on the environment are real and I discuss them 
extensively in my book (Nielsen, 2006), but there is no convincing justification for 
claiming a sudden acceleration in the intensity of these impacts. They appear to 
have been developing monotonically over a long time, maybe even over the past 
2,000,000 years but only recently we started seeing them so clearly that they look 
as if they appeared suddenly. There is no compelling reason for assuming that they 
increased suddenly. On the contrary, there is a clear and compelling evidence that 
they did not appear suddenly, because anthropogenic impacts reflect the growth of 
population while the economic growth reflects the anthropogenic impacts, and 
both, the growth of population and economic growth, were following 
monotonically increasing hyperbolic distributions. The current trajectories 
describing the growth of population and economic growth still follow closely the 
historical hyperbolic trajectories.   
It is obvious that the intensities of human activities increased in recent years 
because the growth of human population was hyperbolic, but it would have yet to 
be proven that they increased non-monotonically. They increased because they 
reflect the hyperbolic growth of population, but the hyperbolic growth is not 
characterised by a sudden surge. The population was increasing monotonically. 
Hyperbolic growth increases fast but monotonically over a short time and it is 
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hardly a revelation that the combined intensity of human activities is now high and 
still fast-increasing. 
We have to be careful when we analyse distributions illustrating human 
activities in recent years because these distributions are likely to reflect hyperbolic 
growth of population, which is monotonic but which creates an illusion of a sudden 
and sustained surge.  
It is most disturbing to see so many misinterpretations of hyperbolic growth. 
Please analyse data carefully and the least you can do is to try to present them by 
using different displays, such as a semilogarithmic display or a display of their 
reciprocal values. Care should be also taken in separating effects associated with 
human activities from effects generated by other sources. It is essential to be 
guided by data and to avoid the strong temptation to see in data what we want to 
see. 
However, there is a clear and distinct feature in the growth of population, which 
we could perhaps use as a marker for the approximate beginning of the modern 
stage of the Anthropocene. It is the current slow and ongoing transition to a new 
trajectory of growth, the transition, which commenced around 1950 (Nielsen, 
2016e, 2017c; see also Figure 11). This transition is not characterised by a sudden 
acceleration to a new and faster trajectory but by a slow diversion to a slower 
trajectory, after just a minor and short-lasting initial boosting, which can be 
demonstrated only by a very close and careful analysis of data. It is a slow 
transition and it is not likely to be completed during the current century but might 
be completed during the next century. It is a rare event because in the past 
2,000,000 years there were only two major transitions and one minor disturbance in 
the middle of the AD time (Nielsen, 2016e; see also Figure 11). This transition 
could be used to define (but not to determine) the approximate beginning of a new 
stage of the Anthropocene. The transition to a new stage of the Anthropocene 
might have started before 1950 but probably not far from that year. If we are 
looking for a unique marker of this transition we might use this unique feature in 
the growth of population.  
If we accept that the current transition in the growth of population to a new 
trajectory can be used as marking the beginning of a new stage of the 
Anthropocene, then its beginning is now. We are in the middle of it but this 
transition is not likely to be completed until well into the next century. If we are 
looking for the stratigraphic markers of this apparent transition they might not be 
strong enough now but only in the future. 
The search for the beginning the Anthropocene and for a proof that it is a 
geological epoch might be interesting but the far more important issue is how to 
survive our current intensive impacts on the environment, how to reduce them and 
how to create a sustainable future. We might be spending too much time trying to 
prove that the Anthropocene is the geological epoch but not enough time to find 
out how we can survive this new stage of human existence. Without our secure 
future, any intelligent form of life, who in some distant future might study the 
history of our planet might not see our Anthropocene as a new geological epoch 
but rather as a sudden extinction of an intelligent species, but not sufficiently 
intelligent to survive.   
 
 
10. Summary and conclusions 
The unconstrained growth of human population and economic growth are 
hyperbolic and they were hyperbolic most of the time in the past 2,000,000 years 
(Nielsen, 2016d, 2016e, 2016g, 2017c). Hyperbolic growth of population was first 
demonstrated for the world population during the AD time (von Foerster, Mora & 
Amiot,1960). I have extended this early study to the BC time, first to the past 
12,000 years (Nielsen, 2016e) and later to the past 2,000,000 years (Nielsen, 
2017c). Deevey (1960) was the first to notice that the growth of population in the 
past 1,000,000 years was in three stages. He was also the first to extend the 
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estimations of the size of population below 10,000 BC. His estimations are 
accepted by the scientific community (see for instance Kapitza, 2006; Kremer, 
1993; Livi-Bacci, 2007). I have demonstrated that these three stages were 
hyperbolic. 
I have also analysed regional and global economic growth (Nielsen, 2016d) as 
well as regional growth of population (Nielsen, 2016g). All these studies lead to 
the same conclusion: the natural tendency for the growth of population and for the 
economic growth was to increase hyperbolically. They were never increasing 
exponentially as often believed. Hyperbolic growth was so stable and so consistent 
that in the past 2,000,000 years there were only two major transitions between 
hyperbolic types of growth and only one minor disturbance of hyperbolic 
trajectory, which caused only small shift in hyperbolic distributions. 
Hyperbolic distributions are confusing because they can be slow over a long 
time and fast over a short time, creating the impression of being made of two 
distinctly different components governed by two distinctly different mechanisms of 
growth. These confusing features are currently erroneously interpreted, in the 
demographic and economic research, as representing two distinctly different stages 
of growth: stagnation and explosion (Nielsen, 2016a). However, hyperbolic 
distributions increase monotonically. There was never stagnation and never a 
transition to a new type of growth, which could be claimed as explosion ignited 
(McFalls, 2007) or detonated (Smil, 1999) by a new force of growth. The perceived 
explosion (the fast growth over a short time) is the natural continuation of 
hyperbolic growth. 
The fundamental feature of the Anthropocene is that it represents strong 
anthropogenic impacts on the environment. Analysis of the growth of population in 
the past 2,000,000 years shows that, with just a few interruptions, the growth was 
monotonically hyperbolic. Human impacts on the environment prevailed over a 
long time and their evidence can be found in archaeological records. It was a 
gradual evolution on the canvas of the hyperbolic growth. Slowly and persistently 
the size of human population was increasing by following hyperbolic trajectories 
(see Figures 10 and 11). With this hyperbolic growth, human skills of interacting 
with the environment were increasing, from the Oldowan stone tool industry 
around 2.5 million years ago to the present highly advanced technology. Data 
suggest that the current strong anthropogenic impacts are the integral part of the 
much longer history of human existence and of the dynamics of the growth of 
population over a long time. The origin of the Anthropocene and its mechanism are 
firmly linked with the growth of population, which was consistently hyperbolic.  
There were various well documented stages in the gradual development of 
technology and knowledge. There were probably also various stages of the 
Anthropocene. The gradual development of technology and knowledge is reflected 
in the gradually increasing anthropogenic impacts on the environment. The 
currently experienced strong impacts probably did not appear suddenly but are the 
results of a much longer evolution over a long time on the canvas of the hyperbolic 
growth of population. The Anthropocene appears to transcend the Pleistocene and 
Holocene epochs. Its modern stage is characterised by a rapid growth of 
population, rapid consumption of natural resources, rapid economic growth and the 
rapidly increasing anthropogenic impacts. All these features can be easily 
explained as the effects of the natural continuation of the monotonically increasing 
hyperbolic growth of human population. 
What we experience now is both new and old. It is new because for the first 
time in human existence we are shaping our global future and perhaps even the 
future of our planet. But it is also old because our increasing impacts on the 
environment can be traced over a long time in the past, impacts which were 
developing slowly to reach the currently experienced high intensities.  
It is still debated whether the currently experienced high intensity of 
anthropogenic impacts can be recognised as marking a new geological epoch. The 
beginning of this potentially new epoch is also hard to establish. The latest fast 
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increase in the growth of population is nothing more than the natural consequence 
of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth. There was no ‚Great 
Acceleration‛ (Steffen, et al., 2015), no significant and sustained boosting, no 
abrupt transition in the growth of population, which could be used as marking the 
beginning of the modern stage of the Anthropocene. The same applies to the 
economic growth, which could be interpreted as the reflection of our interaction 
with the environment and of our impacts on the environment. 
There is, however, a feature in the growth of population, which could be used to 
determine the beginning of this new stage of anthropogenic impacts. It is the 
current gradual and slow transition in the growth of population to a new trajectory 
(Nielsen, 2016e). It is a rare and unique event because there were only two major 
transitions in the past 2,000,000 years and only one minor disturbance between AD 
1195 and 1470. The current transition started with a minor and unsustainable 
boosting in the growth of population around 1950, the boosting, which can be 
revealed only by a close analysis of data. This transition diverts now the historical 
hyperbolic growth to a new but slower trajectory of unknown nature, and is 
expected to continue well into the next century (see Figure 12). 
It is much more difficult to determine the beginning of the modern stage of the 
Anthropocene. New anthropogenic trends could be perhaps used for this purpose 
but we would have to have many examples of these trends to demonstrate a clear 
shift in the anthropogenic impacts. Stratigraphic evidence would be most desirable 
but it is still probably too early to detect a clear change in stratigraphic deposits.    
However, is it really so vitally important to prove that the Anthropocene is a 
new geological epoch and to determine its beginning? It would be interesting if we 
could find such a proof but we might never find it. However, we can now at least 
understand why our impacts on the environment are so strong. They are strong 
because they are the results of the monotonically increasing hyperbolic growth of 
population and of the hyperbolic economic growth. The characteristic feature of 
hyperbolic growth is that it can increase fast over a short time. 
Our fast-increasing impacts are correlated with the fast-increasing growth of 
population. There is nothing mysterious about the origin of the Anthropocene. We 
can explain it as the natural consequence of the hyperbolic growth. Exponential 
growth does not produce such fast-increasing effects and it is even inapplicable 
because human population was never increasing exponentially (Nielsen, 2016e, 
2017c). 
It appears that we might be worried too much about lexical semantics and we 
divert our attention from more important issues: our future, the future of our 
children and grandchildren, and the future of our more distant generations, if we 
and they are going to survive. Our planet might be destroyed by humans but it will 
continue its journey around the Sun and through space. However, our next 
generations, if they survive, might not be worried about the lexical semantics of the 
Anthropocene, about proving that it is a geological epoch and about determining its 
beginning. They will be probably worrying only about how to survive. However, if 
we work harder on creating a sustainable future we might still have teams of 
scholars in the future debating academic issues of the Anthropocene. On the other 
hand, we can now terminate all such discussion, quickly and irrevocably. All we 
need is for someone to be the first to press the button.  
The origin of the Anthropocene is like the origin of a tree. The origin of a tree is 
in the seed planted in the ground because only then is the machinery hidden in the 
genetic code activated and only then does it come to life. The origin of the 
Anthropocene is in the human origin, in the origin of a species with a strong 
potential for the intellectual development.   
The beginning of the Anthropocene is a slightly different matter. It is like the 
time of the beginning of a tree, but when does a tree become a tree? It all depends 
on how we define a tree.  
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Depending on our definition, we could claim that a tree is not always a tree but 
we could also claim that a tree is always a tree. We can define various stages of 
growth of a tree but they are only stages defined by us.  
At a certain stage, a tree becomes strong and it looks like a tree, but this 
sentence is already incorrect because the growth of a tree is gradual. There is no 
sudden transition from a weak non-tree to a strong tree. There is no sudden 
transition to a strong ‚stage‛ because a tree does not grow in stages. The time of 
the beginning of a tree depends on our definition.  
We could distinguish various stages of human impacts on the environment. We 
could distinguish various stages of the Anthropocene and we could claim that the 
current ‚stage‛ is distinctly different than all other stages and we would be right 
because never before did humans have such a strong impact on the environment. 
But when did this strong impact begin? We shall probably never know because as 
with the growth of a tree we do not know when a tree becomes a tree unless we 
define its beginning.  
We can explain the origin of a tree and perhaps even its mechanism of growth 
but we cannot determine the beginning of the strong ‚stage‛ of a tree. We can only 
define it. Likewise, we can explain the origin of the Anthropocene and its 
mechanism but we shall probably never be able to determine the beginning of the 
‚modern stage‛ of the Anthropocene. We can only define it.  
This conclusion might not be liked by those who want to find the beginning of 
the ‚modern stage‛ of the Anthropocene but perhaps with this warning they might 
feel less disappointed if they cannot positively determine its beginning. Human 
impacts on the environment were developing gradually until they became strong, 
but we shall probably never know when precisely they became strong.  
This brings us back to the crucial issue in this discussion. Perhaps we should be 
satisfied with understanding the origin of the Anthropocene and of its mechanism. 
Perhaps we should now understand that with the gradual growth of human 
population over the past 2,000,000 years, human impacts on the environment were 
also developing gradually. They were, no doubt, weak and even negligible for a 
long time but they were gradually increasing. Perhaps by understanding now the 
origin and the mechanism of the Anthropocene we shall stop worrying about trying 
to determine the beginning of its ‚modern stage‛ and focus our attention on how to 
make our future sustainable. 
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